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Abstract:   
This study uses logistic regression to estimate survey data on social engineering policies 
in the agricultural sector.  The study finds that farm operators are unlikely to support a 
policy allowing countries to restrict trade to pursue domestic economic and social policy 
goals if the policies affect international trade.  In particular the findings suggest that farm 
operators with annual gross sales including government payments between $500,000 and 
$999,999 are 80 percent less likely to indicate such a preference.  Farm operators with 
advanced degrees, some college education and a high school diploma are also unlikely to 
indicate such a preference.  In contrast farm operators who receive no income from 
farming or ranching and farm operators who receive a percentage of their family income 
from farming or ranching indicate that countries should be allowed to restrict trade to 
pursue domestic economic and social policy goals even if the policies affect international 





Agricultural Policy as a Social Engineering Tool 
Edmund M. Tavernier and Benjamin M. Onyango 
Introduction 
Policymakers routinely engage in social engineering efforts to accomplish public policy 
goals.  These goals are often pursued with little input from the constituents on whose 
behalf they are proposed or with research examining whether support for such a policy 
even exists. Given the global importance of agricultural trade, the issue of whether 
agricultural policy should be used, as a social engineering tool is surely nontrivial.  Yet 
there exists a paucity of research examining whether countries should restrict trade to 
pursue domestic, economic, and social policy goals even if the policies affect 
international trade.   
Trade restrictions may take several forms.  These forms include variations of 
tariffs and quotas that are used to protect domestic industries from import competition.  
Domestic industries may also be temporarily protected from foreign competition by 
safeguard measures.  These measures ￿either tariffs or quotas ￿ may be used to restrict 
imports of a particular commodity as long as imports of that commodity have increased 
and the higher import level has caused or threaten to cause some harm to the domestic 
industry.    
The World Trade Organization Framework Agreement that negotiators accepted 
in July 2004, and augmented at the December 2005 Ministerial meetings in Hong Kong 
provides guidelines on the commitments that address issues related to direct and indirect 
export subsidies, domestic support and market access among others.  Subsidies ￿direct 
production or export- may also be used to restrict trade.  Direct production subsidies 4 
reduce direct production costs and spur domestic production at the expense of imports.  
Export subsidies facilitate an expansionary trade policy by allowing exporters to sell 
goods in a foreign market cheaper than it costs on the domestic market.  Countries, which 
pursue this trade policy path, are often accused of dumping.  In that regard countries 
whose domestic industries are harmed often make generous use of antidumping and 
countervailing measures in an attempt to protect their domestic industries.  Antidumping 
duties offset what is deemed to be unfair pricing by foreign exporters, while 
countervailing duties ￿level the playing field￿ between a foreign government-subsidized 
exporter and a domestic producer (Bowen and Crowley, 2003).  The use of such 
measures often has a chilling effect on trade with preliminary duties applied in most 
cases.   
Export expansion need not result in the imposition of new or more stringent tariffs 
or quotas.  In some cases an importing country may enter into trading accommodations 
such as orderly marketing agreements with exporting countries or ￿voluntary￿ export 
restrictions that require export countries to voluntarily restrict their level of exports 
within a certain time period.  These accommodations distort worldwide trade flows and 
may adversely affect the welfare of other exporting countries.  Other measures such as 
embargoes deprive exporters in the embargoing country the opportunity to sell products 
in the embargoed country and clearly hinder trade flows.  
In the case of agriculture, while the measures discussed above may, in some 
cases, enhance farm income in the countries pursuing such policies in the short run, they 
often lead to suboptimal solutions for the domestic and wider global economy in the long 
run.  These solutions hold economic implications for the protected industries and the 5 
efficient allocation of resources in the countries where the measures are implemented.  
Thus whether farm operators place greater importance on the short-term economic 
benefits that result from social engineering policies over the wider resource allocation 
issues that result from their implementation is an empirical question.  
To examine that question the paper uses survey data in a New Jersey case study.  
The paper hypothesizes that given the importance of agricultural trade to farm balance 
sheets, farm operators are unlikely to support agricultural policy as a social engineering 
tool where farm sales might be adversely impacted.  To test that hypothesis the paper 
proceeds as follows.  The next section examines briefly examines the literature on policy 
intervention.  This section is followed by the data source and a description of the data.  
This section is followed by the methodology used in the study.  The variable specification 
and working hypotheses section provide the rationale for the variables chosen in the 
study. This section is followed by empirical results.  The paper concludes with a 
discussion and policy implications. 
Review of the Literature   
Most economists agree that free trade and open markets create jobs and raise the standard 
of living (see Quinn, 1997; Edwards, 1998; Pagano, 1993).  This notion is grounded in 
the belief that market allocations of resources are efficient and that such allocations foster 
significant welfare improvements.  Despite this notion, policymakers often intervene in 
the market and erect trade barriers as a mechanism for redistributing income.  This 
intervention is often justified as a means of supporting low family farm income although 
few farm operators receive program benefits or in some cases richer farm operators 
receive most of the program benefits.  Thompson (2005) argues that two-thirds of U.S. 6 
farm operators receive no farm program benefits because they do not grow ￿program 
crops￿.  Shucksmith, Thomson and Roberts (2005) show that the richer core regions of 
Europe receive most of the agricultural support within the common agricultural policy.   
The persistence of trade policy interventions suggests that policymakers may be 
responding to the constituents whom they serve with little regard for sound economic 
policy.  Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) show that such intervention is a largely inefficient 
means of achieving income redistribution.   Dixit (1985) also shows that the use of trade 
policy to redistribute income is suboptimal. Ederington and Minier (2005) suggest that 
trade barriers exist because they benefit politically influential groups who are able to 
lobby successfully for them.   
The agricultural community and the farm organizations that represent them in 
developed countries is one such influential group.  That community is often the largest 
recipient of government outlays in developed countries.  Farm operators in the U.S., 
Europe and other wealthy nations receive about $300 billion in annual farm subsidies.  
These subsidies are proving a major stumbling block in on-going agricultural 
negotiations such as the WTO ministerial meetings in Hong Kong in December 2005.  
Developing countries argue that such subsidies are depressing world prices for the 
commodities in which they have a comparative advantage.  For example, U.S. cotton 
subsidies total approximately $3 billion annually.  The cotton subsidy has helped the U.S. 
become the world￿s second largest producer of cotton, after China, and its largest 
exporter.  Approximately 70% of the four million tons of cotton grown in the U.S. each 
year is sold abroad.  The U.S. would produce about 30 percent less cotton, and cotton 
exports would shrink by around 41 percent in volume in the absence of these subsidies 7 
(www.clas.berkeley.edu).  Thompson (2005) notes that agricultural interest groups have 
effectively managed to direct their campaign contributions to influence legislation of 
interest to them despite the shrinking size of the U.S. agricultural sector and its work 
force relative to the U.S. economy and population. This observation has empirical 
support in recent work.  Tavernier (2005) finds that farm operators who belong to the 
American Farm Bureau do not want food products made with biotechnology labeled even 
if there is a scientifically determined difference in the product.  This position has made it 
increasingly difficult to pass meaningful legislation regarding the labeling of GM foods 
in the U.S. 
Clearly the motivation and reasons for the social engineering efforts in agriculture 
are diverse.  These reasons are political, economic and cultural and often consider the 
strategic role that food and fiber play in all societies.  For example, while significant 
changes have been made to the common agricultural policy (CAP) of the European 
Union (EU), the CAP remains an important mechanism through which member 
governments defend national agricultural policies within a highly protectionist 
institutional structure.  This structure encourages a social policy that strives for the 
achievement of ￿social parity for those who work in agriculture.￿  To achieve that parity, 
policy instruments such as variable import levies, export subsidies in the form of export 
refunds, and other interventionist policies are often used.  These policies greatly distort 
international trade.  In the case of EU sugar, for example, 5 million tons are dumped on 
the world market every year, supporting the international price while the European price 
remains at a guaranteed high.  
www.europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/public/capleaflet/cap_en.htm 8 
National policies are generally made to reflect the interests of the citizens of the 
countries where they are instituted.  In Japan, prewar agricultural policies were aimed at 
freeing tenant farm operators from poverty and the harsh landlord system.  These farm 
operators were considered economically and socially vulnerable and therefore the 
government agricultural polices were meant to address both economic and social 
problems.  Houck (1986) argues that bitter memories of food shortages during and after 
World Wars I and II give several European countries and Japan an incentive to subsidize 
their farm sectors and thereby keep them much larger that they should otherwise be.  In 
Canada, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) was developed between the 1920s and 1940s 
when wheat was an essential part of Canada￿s national policy.  Although wheat revenue 
has declined from 78% to less than 40% between 1950 and 2002, the CWB continues to 
play an important role in Canada￿s agricultural policy.  The U.S. has challenged the CWB 
with unfair trade practices approximately 14 times for different reasons and through 
different avenues (Furtan, 2005). 
Bitter memories over the Bay of Pigs invasion have forced the U.S. to maintain a 
four-decade old embargo against Cuba.  Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho) finds it 
￿perplexing￿ to have a cold war policy that hinders U.S. farm exports when farm 
operators and food processors are facing economic difficulties (quoted in the Star Ledger, 
2005).  U.S. farm operators lose $1.24 billion each year due to the embargo and lifting 
the sanctions would generate an additional $1.6 billion in U.S. GDP, $2.8 billion in sales 
and 31,260 jobs (Maness, 2003).  Yet at the same time that such restrictions are in place, 
the U.S., provides $141 million to 70 U.S. Trade Organizations for the promotion of U.S. 
agricultural products overseas (www.fas.usda.gov). 9 
 
Data and Data Description 
The data used in this study come from the 2001 National Agricultural Food and Public 
Policy Preference Survey conducted in conjunction with land grant universities, Farm 
Foundation and the U.S. National Agricultural Statistics Service.  The National 
Agricultural Statistics Service selected the sample, printed and mailed the questionnaires, 
and conducted follow up survey-related activities.  A random sample of 631 farm 
operators stratified by value of farm sales was chosen for this survey.  One hundred and 
forty-four of the surveys were returned giving a response rate of 23%.  The data 
collection effort consisted of first and second mailings of questionnaires.  Data were 
collected on farm income and risk management policy; conservation and environmental 
policy; trade and food policy; structural issues and socio-economic data for individual 
farm operators.  The sample used for this study consists of farm operators, who in 2001 
(i) grew crops or cut forages; (ii) stored grains or soybeans; (iii) grew vegetables, nuts, 
nursery crops, or other specialty crops; and (iv) had or intended to have dairy, hogs, 
cattle, sheep, poultry, or other livestock on their farm operation.   
Table 1 presents a brief definition of the variables used in the study.  Descriptive 
statistics for those variables are presented in Table 2.  The dependent variable (Restrict) 
which motivates this research asks the question: Should countries be allowed to restrict 
trade to pursue domestic, economic and social policy goals even if the policies affect 
international trade?  A total of 123 farm operators answered that question.  Of that total, 
64 farm operators or 52% indicated that countries should be allowed to restrict trade to 10 
pursue domestic economic and social policy goals even if the policies affect international 
trade.   
Descriptive statistics for the independent variables: educational attainment, sales, 
age, tenure, and farm income are also presented in Table 2.  According to Table 2, 142 
farm operators answered the question regarding the last year of school completed by the 
principal operator of the farm or ranch.  Of that total, 3 (2%) completed grade school, 6 
(4%) had some high school education, 32 (23%) had a high school diploma, 32 (23%) 
had some college education, 39 (27%) had a bachelor￿s degree and 30 (21%) had an 
advanced degree.  In the sales category, a majority (47%) of farm operators had average 
annual sales from their farm operations, including government program benefits, of less 
than $10,000.   Eighty-five percent of the farm operators were older than 45 years old and 
most (74%) own the land that they farm or ranch.  A majority of farm operators (45%) 
typically earned 1-25% of their family income from farming. 
Methodology  
The methodology used in this study has been presented elsewhere but is repeated here to 
facilitate the discussion (see Tavernier, 2005).  The model assumes that farm operators 
maximize an intertemporal profit function. Clearly given the current discussions 
surrounding the Doha Round trade negotiations, a willingness to restrict trade to pursue 
domestic, economic and social policy goals would invite retaliation and may make farm 
operators worse off in the long-run as international trade contracts. Following that 
rationale, the model assumes that once a farm operator makes the choice to restrict or not 
to restrict trade s/he maximizes a profit function subject to uncertainty about that 11 
decision.  The random component comes from maximization errors, and other 
unobserved characteristics of choices or measurement errors in the exogenous variables.   
Let the profit function of farm operator i, making the j-th choice be, 
  ij ij ij U ε π + =          ( 1 )  
where  Uij = (lnX i1 , lnX i2 , ￿.., lnX ik ) with lnX im representing the set of m observable 
characteristics of the i-th farm operator, and  ij ε  is a random variable.  If the i-th farm 
operator maximizes profit s/he will choose decision j rather than k according to the 
expression,  
  . , , j k k ik ij ≠ ∀ > π π           ( 2 )  
Note that the profit function has a random component.  Then the probability that choice j 
is made by the i-th farm operator can be defined as, 
 
  . , ), ( Pr j k k ob P ik ij ij ≠ ∀ > = π π       ( 3 )  
It can be shown that if the error term  ij ε  has standard Type 1 extreme distributions with 
density 
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P           ( 5 )  
which is the basic equation defining the multinomial logit model.  In the case where j = 
2, the i-th farm operator will choose the first alternative if  0 2 1 > − i i π π .  If the random 
ij π have independent extreme value distributions, their difference can be shown to have a 12 
logistic distribution, and we can obtain the standard logistic regression model.  That 
model is chosen for this study because of its mathematical simplicity and because its 
asymptotic characteristic constrains the predicted probabilities to a range between zero 
and one (Maddala, 1983).   
Using equation (5) and assuming that  ij π is a linear combination of the 
explanatory variables, we can estimate the coefficient of each variable using maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) because the data set contains individual rather than 
aggregate observations (see Gujarati, 1992).  The parameter estimates from the MLE are 
consistent and asymptotically efficient (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991).   
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where Y represents a discrete choice among j alternatives, and the set of parameters β 
reflect the impact of changes in X  on the probability.  The marginal effects which are the 
partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to the vector of characteristics and 
computed at the means are given by, 















, j = 1,2,￿.,m.        (7) 
  The model assumes that the probability of observing a particular outcome is 
dependent on a vector of explanatory variables, X. 
Variable Specification and Working Hypotheses 
The dichotomous dependent variable (Restrict) in this study indicates the preference a 
farm operator expresses for whether countries should be allowed to restrict trade to 13 
pursue domestic, economic and social policy goals even if the policies affect international 
trade.  The independent variables are chosen because of their hypothesize relationship 
with that variable.  Specifically, the findings of, and inferences from past studies and 
existing theoretical literature provide the basis for the selection of the independent 
variables in this study that structure the working hypotheses.  However, in most cases, the 
lack of studies that utilize behavioral data and examine their relationship to trade 
restrictions, make predictions about the directions of the coefficients difficult.  The 
variables are discussed below. 
  In the case of education, this study hypothesizes that education increases the 
farmer operator￿s ability to get, process and use information (Asrat et al., 2004).  Thus a 
higher level of educational attainment helps farm operators understand the implications 
and consequences of a policy that restricts trade to pursue domestic economic and social 
policy goals particularly when that policy affects international trade.  Such restriction 
would serve to curb international trade volume and subject the countries restricting trade 
to possible retaliation.  Therefore the coefficient of the education variable is hypothesized 
to have a negative sign. 
    The age of farm operators may be viewed as a composite that represents farming 
experience and planning horizon.  While beginning and probably younger farm operators 
may view trade restriction as providing ￿protection￿ from international competition, older 
farm operators, ￿with the benefit of time,￿ may have a better understanding of the 
importance of agricultural trade to their agricultural balance sheets.  Thus the influence of 
age on ￿trade restriction￿ is an empirical question. 14 
  Farm size is often used in profitability studies (Whittaker, Lin and Vasavada, 
1995).  If sales are used as a proxy for farm size, one could surmise that while revenues 
from large farms would be more sensitive to external shocks brought on by 
macroeconomic conditions, smaller farms would also be affected by such shocks.  For 
example, to the extent that trade restrictions result in retaliation, more agricultural 
products would remain on the domestic market and depress the price of the affected 
commodity.  In that case, all farm operators, irrespective of farm size would be affected 
by the fall in price of the affected commodity.  Thus the coefficient of the farm size 
variable is hypothesized to have a negative sign. 
  Although average annual gross sales provide a measure of farm size, it does not 
necessarily follow that such sales provide most of the income of farm households.   
Tavernier, Temel and Li (1997) show that off-farm income plays a major part in the 
income of farm households.  Thus a farm operator with sales of $10,000 - $$49,999 per 
year and off-farm income of over $150,000 per year generates at most 25% of income 
from farming.  Moreover, the farm operation where 51-75% of family income is earned 
from farming may fall in any of the farm sales categories.  Thus the sign of the 
coefficient of the income (inc) variable is unclear.       
Empirical Results 
The estimated coefficients with t-ratios from the logit models that provide the best model 
fit are presented in Table 3.  One of the variables from each category is dropped to avoid 
multicollinearity.  In addition to those results, Table 3 also presents the marginal effects 
and goodness of fit measures such as the Chi-square test statistic, the Mc Fadden R
2 test 
statistic, and the percent of successful predictions.  These measures are discussed  in 15 
Tavernier and Turvey (2006).  The Chi-square test statistic tests the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients of all the independent variables equal zero.  The null hypothesis is 
rejected at the significant level of 0.02 and indicates that the model has significant 
explanatory power.  The Mc Fadden R
2 value, 0.20, also indicates an extremely good fit 
for the estimated model (see Bell et al., 1994).  This statistic is generally low in binary 
dependent variable models estimated with cross-section data (Pindyck and Rubinfield, 
1991).  The percent of correct predictions is also reasonably high.  This measure predicts 
whether or not an event will occur given a set of explanatory variables (Judge, et al., 
1982).  The model correctly predicts 71% of the responses. 
The estimated coefficients from variables that measure the age of farm operators 
and the percent of family income earned from farming or ranching are positive, while 
coefficients from variables measuring annual gross sales, including government program 
benefits, and education are negative.  The results support the hypothesis, that in general, 
farm operators whose sales are likely to be adversely affected by the use of social 
engineering as a policy tool are unlikely to express a preference for such a policy.   
Specifically the results suggest that except for farm operators with sales under $10,000 
and farm operators with sales between $250,000 and $499,999, farm operators across the 
sales category are unlikely to favor a policy allowing countries to restrict trade to pursue 
domestic economic and social policy goals if the policies affect international trade.  For 
example farm operators with annual gross sales including government payments between 
$500,000 and $999,999 are 80 percent less likely to indicate that countries should be 
allowed to restrict trade to pursue domestic economic and social policy goals if the 
policies affect international trade. 16 
In addition to sales, the results suggest that there also exists a negative 
relationship between the education variable and farm operators who indicate that 
countries should be allowed to restrict trade to pursue domestic economic and social 
policy goals if the policies affect international trade.  Farm operators with some college 
education are 58% less likely to indicate that countries should be allowed to restrict trade 
to pursue domestic economic and social policy goals if the policies affect international 
trade.  Farm operators with a bachelor￿s degree and those with a high school diploma are 
36% and 33% less likely to indicate such a preference, respectively. 
 The estimated coefficient from the variable that measures the age of principal 
operators between the ages of 35 and 44 is positive and suggests the farm operators 
within that age category are 42% more likely to indicate that countries should be allowed 
to restrict trade to pursue domestic economic and social policy goals even if the policies 
affect international trade.  While not directly comparable to the current finding, young 
farmers and ranchers ages 18-35 in a recent American Farm Bureau Federation survey 
indicate that the best way to increase overall agricultural profitability is to boost US 
agricultural exports (The New Jersey Farmer, 2003).  Clearly restricting trade runs 
counter to that view. 
The positive coefficients of the variable that measures the percent of family 
income earned from farming or ranching suggest that farm operators in that income 
category are also more likely to indicate that countries should be allowed to restrict trade 
to pursue domestic economic and social policy goals even if the policies affect 
international trade.  For example, farm operators who earn between 51% and 75% of their 
income from farming or ranching are 72% more likely to indicate such a preference.   17 
Discussion and Policy Implications 
The World Trade Organization Framework Agreement that negotiators accepted in July 
2004, and augmented at the December 2005 Ministerial meetings in Hong Kong provides 
guidelines on the commitments that might be contained in a Doha Development Agenda 
agreement.  These commitments address issues related to direct and indirect export 
subsidies, domestic support and market access among others.  In light of these current 
issues, the present study is both timely and relevant, and provides new insights into the 
debate on whether countries should be allowed to restrict trade to pursue domestic, 
economic, and social policy goals if those policies affect international trade. 
The results strongly suggest that farm operators view market access or the 
absence or diminution of conditions that restrict trade as an important factor in 
international trade.  In particular, farm operators across sales categories indicate that trade 
should not be restricted for socio-economic policy goals.  Given the importance of 
agricultural trade this finding is not surprising since restricting trade would adversely 
affect trade volume and farm profits as domestic prices decreased.   
Given the complexities of international trade one may argue that increased 
educational attainment may provide farm operators with a greater understanding of the 
policy implications of trade restrictions.  These implications include, for example, the 
possibility of trade retaliation and the contraction of international trade.  The results 
suggest that farm operators across education categories are unlikely to favor a policy to 
restrict trade to pursue domestic, economic, and social policy goals if those policies affect 
international trade. 18 
In contrast to the education and sales results the percent of income a family 
earned from farming or ranching and a the age of farm operators, increase the likelihood 
that farm operators would indicate that trade should be restricted to pursue domestic, 
economic, and social policy goals even if those policies affect international trade.  One 
can only conjecture on the rationale for such finding.  Clearly one can defend the finding 
that a farm operator who receives no income from farming or ranching may be indifferent 
or favor restricting trade because of the lack of direct economic consequences on his or 
her farm operation.  However, the motivation for a farm operator who receives 51%-75% 
of his or income from farming is less clear.  This finding suggests a protectionist 
sentiment and the belief that farm operators who receive any percentage of their income 
from farming or ranching and farm operators between the age of 35 and 44 years old 
would be better off under a closed policy regime.  The ￿young farmers￿￿ perception may 
be reflecting the ￿infant industry￿ argument and the need for protection from import 
competition while their operation ￿grows up.￿ 
The results of this study go to a larger issue in trade policy intervention and the 
actions of policymakers.  In particular, policymakers often intervene in markets and 
justify their actions on the constituents that they serve.  While certain segments of an 
economy may argue for protection, in the case of agriculture, the results seem to suggest 
that farm operators would prefer free trade to market intervention.  This conclusion also 
suggests, that all thins being equal, policymakers may have less to fear from the 
constituents than they believe. 19 
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Table 1:  Definition of Variables                                                                                                                       
                    
Variable            Definition      
Restrict  dummy variable, takes the value 1, if respondent indicates 
that countries should be allowed to restrict trade to pursue 
domestic economic and social policy goals even if the 
policies affect international trade, 0 otherwise   
     
 
Educational Attainment  dummy variable, takes the value 1 in the relevant interval, 
to indicate the last year of school completed by the 
respondent, 0 otherwise 
   
Sales  dummy variable, takes the value 1 in the relevant interval, 
to indicate the approximate average annual gross sales from 
the farm in recent years, including government loan 
program benefits, 0 otherwise    
 
Age  dummy variable, takes the value 1 in the relevant interval, 
to indicate the age of the respondent, 0 otherwise   
 
Farm income  dummy variable, takes the value 1 in the relevant interval, 
to indicate the percent of family income typically earned 
from farming or ranching, 0 otherwise 22 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent and Independent Variables                                           
                    
Variable            Number                                         Percent*                   
Dependent Variable  
  Restrict     123      100 
  Y e s      6 4       5 2  
  N o      5 9       4 8  
Independent Variables   
Educational  Attainment    142      100 
 Grade  School     3      2 
 Some  High  School    6      4 
 High  School  Dip.    32      23 
 S o m e   C o l l e g e      3 2       2 3  
Bachelor￿s  Degree    39      27 
 Advanced  Degree    30      21 
 
Sales       139      100 
 Under  $10,000     66      47   
 10k-$49,999     32      23 
 50k-$99,999          11      8 
 100k-$249,999   12      9 
250k-$499,999   7      5 
 500k-$999,999   4      3 
 $1,000,000  and  over    7      5 
 
Age       140      100 
 35-44years     20      14 
 45-54years     42      30 
 55-64years     37      26 
 65  years  and  over    41      29 
 
Farm  income      138      100 
 None      21      15   
 1-25%      62      45 
 25-50%    22      16 
 51-75%    3      2 
 76-100%     30      22 









Table 3. Logistic Regression Results of Determinants of Social Engineering 
Variable  Estimated Coefficient  t-ratio  Marginal Effect    
Intercept 2.1474  (1.582)    
        
Age3544 1.6843  (1.879)
* 0.42   
        
Age4554 0.5144  (0.80)    
        
Age5564 0.2554  (0.408)    
        
Salesunder10 -2.2777  (1.55)    
        
Sales1049 -2.7828  (1.833)*  -0.69  
        
Sales5099 -3.4854  (2.228)**  -0.87  
        
Sales100249 -2.4849  (1.664)*  -0.62  
        
Sales250499 -1.2805  (0.866)    
          
Sales500999 -3.2176  (1.582)*  -0.80   
        
Incnone 3.1976  (3.043)*** 0.79   
        
Inc125 0.8645  -1.012    
        
Inc2650 1.4929  (1.705)*  0.37   
        
Inc5175 2.8685  (1.830)*  0.72   
        
Grade -1.0511  (0.580)    
        
HS -1.2811  (0.934)    
        
HSDip -1.3156  (1.750)*  -0.33   
        
College -2.342  (3.007)*** -0.58  
        
BA -1.4542  (2.175)**  -0.36   
        
Sample size  116      
Mc Fadden R
2 .20      
Chi-squareddf 31.9118     
Significance level  .02      
Correct prediction (%)  71      
 